Reduced Employer Payroll Taxes: A Direct Path to Job Creation

A mega-trend drives economic disquiet in developed countries; the return on labor is falling while the return on capital remains relatively higher. You intuitively sense this. Economist Thomas Piketty provided data to support it in his 2013 book, Capital in the 21st Century.

This trend explains the restiveness about anemic economic growth and rising income inequality that is so evident in western nations. Brexit supporters in the United Kingdom reacted to foreign workers who drove down wages. Declining prospects for a better life motivated U.S. voters to elect Donald Trump; immigration and free trade were the lightning rods he raised. Similar sensibilities have a following in France, as evidenced by the support garnered by Marine Le Pen, the nationalist party’s presidential candidate.

There are three interweaving drivers of the declining return on labor—technology, management theory and a greater supply of labor:

  • Technology: the digitization of information makes it easy to relocate work. It is difficult to name jobs where earnings growth is not adversely affected by the ability to move work elsewhere. Robotics and other forms of machine learning have a similar effect—they move work from humans.
  • Management Theory: Beginning in the 1980s, companies decided they didn’t have to do everything themselves. Outsourcing took root with computer operations, payroll and customer support then moved to manufacturing. Offshoring was a skip and a hop away. Lean organizational philosophies are a variation of the idea and they are popular among emerging companies, which provides an ironic foretelling about the future of work. Since the 1970s, these types of employers have been responsible for more job creation than Fortune 500 companies.
  • Greater Supply of Labor: The end of the Cold War led China and India to develop an export orientation and this created wage pressure on workers in higher wage countries. It is unrelenting; China, for instance, faces wage competition from other Asian nations while it competes with western economies for high skill work.

The political landscape looks startling different once you recognize the drivers. As different as the moment in The Wizard of Oz when the screen transforms from black and white to color. Essentially, optimism among those who rely on the return on labor has been eroding because it is easier to change where their work is done.

In the face of these three drivers, is it possible for today’s job market to look much better? Might protectionist trade policies have significantly blunted their effect? If so, might government administration of those policies made the economy less competitive?

We can’t change what these drivers have wrought–the genie is out of the bottle. Today, there are two forward-looking questions. What policies will enhance productivity and thus, economic competitiveness? And, what can be done to ease the social unrest that has been unleashed?

Since economies are complex, policy prescriptions tend to rely on indirect cause and effect. Advocates of lower income tax rates, for example, believe that the prospect of higher after-tax income will lead businesses to make investments that, in turn, create domestic jobs. The idea relies on plenty of speculation.  Those who favor investments in education also rely on indirect solutions—more education makes a workforce more attractive to employers and that, in turn, creates more and better jobs.

Indirect solutions rely on theory, logic and intuition for validation, however, it can be easier to find hard evidence for direct solutions.

There is a direct solution for job creation—one that can test the effect of lower taxes on employment. Simply reduce employer payroll taxes. If it costs less to employ people, theory has it that businesses will hire more of them, right? Employers and employees share the payroll tax burden.  Employees see their portion on payday but may not realize that their employer pays about the same amount. The self-employed pay both portions.

The employer portion is a vestige of an age when job creation wasn’t such a concern and when labor was a larger component of product cost.  Increasingly, the cost is in materials with low labor content and business infrastructure/overhead; the drivers of the declining return on labor also reduce its cost.

The relationship between taxes and employment is intimate at the payroll tax level; all employers pay it and all would benefit from a reduction. By contrast, a reduction in the income tax rate only benefits employers with taxable income. The correlation between that and the payroll is weak—companies with lots of workers may be unprofitable and profitable ones need not have many domestic employees.

Tax code reform is desirable for many reasons…but job creation isn’t a direct one. Cause and effect between income taxes and job creation is indirect and uncertain.

Furthermore, lower income tax rates don’t affect the three drivers for the declining return on labor.  They could, however, increase income inequality; the rates on capital gains is already much lower that the rates on earned income.

Another problem with relying on the income tax code to encourage job creation is that law-making is influenced by special interests. Congress is the Wizard of Oz of tax policy: a benefit of an employer payroll tax reduction is that legislators will not feel compelled to cry out “Pay no attention to the (lobbyist and campaign contributor) behind the curtain!”  That’s because there will be broad support for changes that encourage employment of U.S. workers.

How to pay for it? A tax on the sale of securities in the secondary markets. One paid when a stock or bond is sold by an investor to another investor (i.e., not when it is sold by a company to raise capital). Effectively, it would be a sales tax on transactions that generate the return on capital. A minuscule tax rate would cover it. A higher one could be used to help make healthcare and education more affordable, something that would ease workforce anxiety and position it to be more productive.

Direct solutions trump indirect ones. A tax on the return on capital to underwrite the needs of those who rely on the return on labor makes economic sense—it promotes job creation and growth. It makes political sense too: the net loser from the three drivers vote—foreign workers and robots don’t.


Karl M. Sjogren is writing a book about an idea for a performance-based capital structure for companies that seek to raise venture capital via a public offering. It is called The Fairshare Model because it balances and aligns the interests of investors and employees…capital and labor.

A 2:3 Paradigm for Investor Risk in Venture-Stage Companies

risk-paradigm-image How might one evaluate an investment in a venture-stage company? That is, one that presents high risk of failure and will require more money from investors in the future to survive.

It is a tough question, one that isn’t just the province of investors in private offerings—it affects average investors and anyone concerned they will be imprudent in their investment choice.

Venture capital can be raised in a private or public offering. Wall Street initial public offerings routinely raise venture capital; think most tech and virtually all biotech IPOs. “Venture capital” is defined by the issuing company’s risks, not how it is raised.

The JOBS Act of 2012 led to changes in securities regulations that make it less burdensome for companies to sell stock and for investors to invest in them. It will take time to assess their effect but this much is apparent—more young companies will sell their shares to the public in the years ahead.

The potential, not their performance, is their appeal. Thus, how to evaluate an investment in one?

Below, is a framework I developed while writing a book about a performance-based capital structure for companies that raise venture capital via an IPO.

It explains why I hold two opposing views about the JOBS Act reforms. I am enthusiastic about crowdfunding, online platforms and Reg. A+ offerings as they improve access to capital for entrepreneurs—people who contribute much to our economic vitality—but I fear that average investors will fare poorly when they invest in them.

The 2:3 Paradigm

I call this framework the 2:3 Paradigm.

The ”2” refers to the two fundamental risks for investors—failure and valuation. The first is that the venture will fail to meet expectations. The second is that the investor will overpay for a position, something that can happen even if the company meets expectations.

These risks underpin all others. Those related to market, technology, and management are a blend of these two. That is the case for fraud as well; it is failure and valuation risk garnished with false or inadequate disclosure.

Failure risk is omnipresent in a venture stage investment. Valuation risk lurks as well; an investor may invest in a successful company but lose money (or make less than expected) because the buy-in valuation was too high.

The “3” in the model’s title indicates that there are three paths to address them—analytics, cohorts and structure—and they can be combined for a variety of effects. Similarly, the primary colors—red, yellow and blue—can create an array of colors.

The following table shows that investors use two of these paths—analytics and cohorts—to mitigate failure risk and that there isn’t a structural solution for failure. In contrast, all three paths are potentially available to investors to mitigate valuation risk.

2:3 Paradigm for Risks in a Venture-Stage Investment 3 Pathways to Mitigate Risk
Analytics Cohorts Structure
2 Fundamental Risks Failure X X
Valuation X X X

Analytics Path

Analytics refer to data that one can independently assess. Established companies have a lot of it. Young companies don’t and what they do have has dubious predictive value, especially if they utilize novel technologies or business models.

In 1968, Edward Altman at New York University devised an algorithm to predict whether a public company would be bankrupt within two years. It weighed measures of profitability, working capital and market value for indications of weakness. Altman dubbed the result a Z-Score.

Could there be a forward-looking measure for early-stage companies? One that assesses the potential for success, not failure? It is a beguiling challenge, one that Nimish Gandhi at Invesights ( has tackled. A former academic who has studied small companies, he has a methodology to predict the viability of early-stage and established companies. Invesights’ algorithm generates a score called Investment Outlook Score (IOS), akin to a FICO score that measures a person’s creditworthiness. Like a Z Score, an IOS seeks to portend the future. Unlike the Z Score, it measures business vitality.

Independent of such a system, analytics can screen for failure risk by identifying dubious assumptions, evaluating competitive advantage and the reliance of a company on future infusions of capital.

Analytics is central to valuation analysis and discounted cash flow (DCF) is its cornerstone. Theoretically, it is appealing; the present value of an enterprise is the sum of its future cash inflows, discounted for the time value of money (interest rate) and a risk factor. In practice, it is only as helpful as the earnings projections, which can be unreliable for established companies and are routinely so for start-ups. Computer scientists have an expression that fits—garbage in, garbage out.

DCF can suggest a valuation when an investor’s anticipated exit is via acquisition of the company. But there are problems here too. Namely, its very risky to set a valuation based on a discount to an outcome that may never happen. Then too, any purchase price may be a function of the company’s strategic value to the acquirer, not its cash flow, and that can vary greatly based on who the buyer is and the company’s future market position.

Multiples offer another analytic approach to valuation. Public stock analysts look at the multiple the market applies to a company’s earnings per share—its price/earnings ratio. Acquirers and private equity (PE) firms value companies using a multiple of sales, profits or indicators of value such as the number of customers. When a valuation exceeds a multiple’s norm, valuation risk climbs.

Multiples are not particularly useful to VCs for they invest in new technologies and disruptive business models and it is hard to identify relevant multiples for such opportunities.

Bottom line: in theory, analytic tools offer a compelling way to establish a valuation for a company but in practice, they have shortcomings, especially when dealing with venture stage companies.

Cohort Path

A cohort is a group whose members share a common characteristic, and here it refers to those who influence an investor’s assessment of a company. Since one need not have a personal relationship with someone to be influenced by them, the pool of potential cohorts is immense.

Virtually everyone heeds what others say or do. That makes the cohort path the most popular way to assess failure and valuation risks. As social creatures, investors want to know, what do others think of a company? Is it likely to go up in value?

Analysts who follow public stocks are on the analytic path when they consider the fundamentals of a business and its prospects for growth. They are on the cohort path when they compare their assessment to a company’s market value.

Technical analysis is a pure form of the cohort path. It’s practitioners study stock price charts to identify valuation risk. In wizard-like fashion, they attempt to discern meaning from patterns of trading that look like heads, shoulders, teacups, and so on. The same can be said for momentum investors, who buy when prices trend up and sell when they do the opposite. It sounds odd, but machine-based trading systems pay attention to cohorts too…they monitor the behavior of other robo-traders as well those who are human.

VC and PE firms use cohort networks to help them evaluate both failure and valuation risk in private companies. Angel investors do this too when they approach due diligence as a team sport, coordinating it with others.

In contrast, investors evaluating a public venture stage company have poor quality access to cohorts. Financial advisors sensibly discourage such investments because of their high failure and valuation risk, but that doesn’t prevent someone who wants to take a chance from doing so. Venturesome public investors are left with media reports, press releases, and online postings. These can help assess failure risk but they often offer notoriously poor information about valuation risk. Some of these cohorts put out misleading information for their own gain. They seek to spur demand for shares as part of a pump and dump scam or crash them to profit from short sale positions.

Access to the cohort path for investors in venture-stage companies is evolving. In 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission began to let websites share information about private offerings with accredited investors. In 2016, the SEC allowed other types of websites to provide information on offerings to any investor. Such developments are recent and suggest dynamism for the cohort path in the years to come.

Structure Path

The structure path is about the terms of an investment. A capital structure facilitates deal terms, hence the name.

A corporation’s capital structure is defined in a document that goes by names such as the articles of incorporation or certificate of incorporation. It describes, among other things, the rights of its shareholders. The document must be amended before unique deal terms can be granted. For a country, the document is equivalent to its constitution, which sets forth, among other things, the rights of its citizens.

Deal terms don’t reduce failure risk. They can limit valuation risk, however, and significantly so. Put another way, the structure path does not help investors avoid a failure, but it can keep them from overpaying for a position.

The smartest, best networked investors in the venture space—VC and PE firms—are skilled at using the analytics and cohort paths to reduce failure risk. But since it’s hard for anyone to know the “right valuation” for a company, analytics are of limited value when assessing valuation risk. The cohort path is similarly handicapped because everyone has this problem. Therefore, while these investors use these two paths to evaluate valuation risk, they rely on the structure path to control it.

More precisely, VC and PE firms use the structure path to secure deal terms that can reduce the significance of their buy-in valuation…effectively, a valuation safety net.

A price ratchet clause is a basic way to do this. It retroactively reduces an investor’s effective price per share if later investors get a lower price (i.e., protected investor gets additional shares for free). Another is a liquidation preference clause, which entitles an investor to a preferential return, relative to other shareholders, and it is activated if the company is acquired or otherwise liquidated. A 3X liquidation preference, for example, entitles an investor to receive three times its investment from the proceeds before others get anything.

Thus, VC and PE investors tell entrepreneurs, “Give me my terms and I’ll give you your valuation.”

Apply the 2:3 Paradigm to Valuation Risk

Before considering how the three pathways address valuation risk, let’s touch on how a valuation is established.

Three are three approaches—asset, income, and market. The asset approach looks at the value of a company’s assets. The income approach estimates the present value of its future earnings and, possibly, its eventual value to an acquirer. The market approach uses the valuation of comparable companies as a marker. A valuation amount may reflect input from more than one approach.

This table shows how the approaches to establish a valuation intersect with the paths investors can take to mitigate the risk that it is too high.

Valuation: Ways to Set the Amount and Mitigate the Risk Mitigate the Risk
Analytics Path Cohort Path Structure Path
Establish the Amount Asset Approach X X
Income Approach X
Market Approach X


  • The asset approach is on the analytics and cohort paths because asset valuation can reflect independent assessment and/or the opinion of others.
  • The income approach is on the analytics path as it relies on independent assessment of DCF analysis, valuation multiples or similar metrics.
  • The market approach is on the cohort path because its goal is to evaluate what others think.

Note that no valuation approach utilizes the structure path. That’s because structure doesn’t set a valuation, it protects against a bad one. It can protect new investors from a valuation that proves to be too high (e.g., price protection, preferential rights to a return, claw back provisions). It can also protect current shareholders from a too low valuation from new investors (e.g., earn out provisions).

There are two key points here:

  1. Valuations based on the asset, income and market approach can be unreliable for established companies and are virtually always unreliable for a venture stage company. That’s not an indictment of the approaches as much as an acknowledgement of how challenging it is to get reliable data.
  2. Structure can make a valuation elastic, conditioned on subsequent events.

The final table shows that the structure path is available to private investors but not public ones.

Access to Paths Analytics Path Cohort Path Structure Path
Private (pre-IPO) investors X X X
Public investors X X

This one raises a question. If companies offer pre-IPO investors price protection, why don’t they offer it to IPO investors too?

Fundamentally, its because IPO investors don’t demand it, so issuers have little incentive to offer it.

Undoubtedly, this is because many public investors are valuation unaware. After all, if you are unsure what a valuation is, how to calculate it or how to evaluate one…why would you call for valuation protection?

Then too, the way-things-are works rather well for valuation savvy IPO investors who trade out of their position soon after they get shares. Rather than buy and hold, they buy and flip. For them, valuation protection comes from being a favored client of the underwriter, able to get an “IPO pop” of fifteen percent or more. If you doubt that, ask yourself, “If Wall Street banks allocated IPO shares in a lottery, how long would it take privileged investors to call for price protection?”

And, if public investors signaled interest in terms that reduce valuation risk, would issuers offer it? Surely, yes, for it is the nature of markets to respond to demand.

If they wanted to, how would companies offer it? While there would be variation in what was offered, all issuers would share a quality—they would have a multi-class capital structure when they have an IPO. It allows a corporation to treat IPO investors different from other shareholders. A single-class capital structure requires that all shareholders to be treated the same.

VC and PE backed companies always have a multi-class capital structure when they are private. Employees get a different stock than investors (i.e., employees get common stock and investors get preferred stock). When there are multiple rounds of financing, investors in each round have a unique class of preferred stock that specifies their deal terms.

Typically, when such a company has an IPO, its multi-class capital structure converts to a single class structure. The different classes of preferred stock convert to the common stock held by employees in accordance with their terms and new common stock are issued to IPO investors.

However, IPO issuers need not have a single class of stock. When Ford Motor Company went public in 1956, it sold Class A shares to the public while certain insiders held Class B shares with super-voting rights. Nearly fifty years later, the Class B shares represented about 2% of Ford’s total shares but controlled 40% of the vote. In 2004, Google took a similar approach with its IPO; the Class A it sold to the public had one vote per share and the Class B shares held by some pre-IPO shareholders had 10 per share. Since then, several companies have used a multi-class structure to similar effect in their IPO.

Note the irony of the way-things-are. Private companies adopt a multi-class capital structure to protect new investors while IPO issuers use one to protect insiders.

The Problem with Public Venture Capital

I opened this piece by saying I’m supportive of initiatives that make it less expensive for young companies to raise venture capital from public investors; such companies contribute mightily to economic growth and job creation. At the same time, I fear that average investors will fare poorly when they invest in them.

Not because of failure risk. Over time, I suspect many will be able to reasonably evaluate it themselves or through cohorts.

The problem is valuation risk. Average investors will be exposed to a full dose of it for two reasons.

  1. Companies value themselves much higher when they sell stock to public investors than to private ones.
  2. Public investors have poor access to good cohort data and virtually no access to the structure path.

Valuation Risk Reduction for Public Investors

Here are two ideas to help public investors reduce their exposure to valuation risk.

Valuation Disclosure

The first is a valuation disclosure requirement for offering documents. All investors, private and public, could reduce their valuation risk if the SEC makes it easier to use the cohort path.

It can do this by requiring all issuers of equity securities, whether private or public, to disclose the valuation implicit in their offering. That is, make issuers state in their prospectus that “based on the terms of our offering, our valuation is $X prior to selling our new shares” or words to that effect. Presently, investors must calculate the valuation and, I’ll bet, many don’t know how or neglect to.

This data point will enhance the competitiveness of capital markets by making it easy for data aggregation services to provide two key data points.

  • The valuation of comparable companies, be they private or public.
  • The valuation trend line for the issuer—from the earliest round to the present one.

The effect would be to make equity capital markets function more like real estate markets, where websites allow buyers and sellers to view the price of comparable properties and a home’s valuation history.

Fairshare Model

The second idea is to encourage companies to use a multi-class capital structure to reduce valuation risk for IPO investors; to treat public venture capital with the respect given to private venture capital.

The Fairshare Model, the book I’m writing, presents an idea for how to do this. It’s about a performance-based capital structure for companies that raise venture capital via an IPO.

The Fairshare Model has two classes of stock—one trades, the other doesn’t, but both vote on shareholder matters. Pre-IPO and IPO investors get the tradable stock, known as Investor Stock. For already delivered performance, employees get it too. For their future performance, employees get the non-tradable stock, called Performance Stock. Based on criteria described in the company’s prospectus, Performance Stock converts to Investor Stock. The criteria can change if both classes of stock agree.

The Fairshare Model minimizes investor valuation risk because the IPO valuation does not include the value of future performance. That means an idea alone is not worth $1 million. There are no unicorns. Rather, there is powerful incentive for employees to deliver performance.

Intriguingly, the Fairshare Model creates incentive for an issuer to offer a low IPO valuation. Since employees largely hold Performance Stock, they are focused on what it takes to convert it to Investor Stock. If a rise in the price of Investor Stock is a measure of performance, employees will want to see a low IPO valuation. This, in turn, allows them to say to IPO investors, “We don’t do well unless you do.”

The Fairshare Model can also reduce failure risk by helping issuers attract and manage human capital. In addition to pay, benefits, and stock options on its Investor Stock, a company can offer employees an interest in its Performance Stock. It pays off when they, as a team, meet the conversion criteria.

Companies will consider using the model if a critical mass of investors signal their interest in it because a well-performing team can end up with more wealth than they would had they raised their capital from a VC.

The essence of the Fairshare Model is that it balances and aligns the interests of employees and investors—labor and capital.

This has implications that go beyond this piece, such as economic growth, income inequality, and workforce competitiveness. These topics and more are discussed in the full draft of The Fairshare Model, which can be obtained at the “resources” tab at


I hope I’ve given you a fresh, meaningful way to think about capital formation in the venture space.

There isn’t much that can be done to minimize failure risk—it is a defining aspect of this terrain. It’s a different story with respect to valuation risk.

All players, particularly average investors, will benefit from more robust market data, which is what a valuation disclosure requirement is about.

VC and PE investors have shown that the structure path can reduce valuation risk; the Fairshare Model takes a page from that playbook.

With articles like this and my forthcoming book, I hope to seed a movement to reimagine capitalism. Anything that ambitious takes time, of course, but begins with ideas. The more specific they are, the more actionable, the better. Should you challenge mine, I welcome it. Any effort to change the-way-things-are must survive the crucible of criticism.

If you like the ideas discussed here and in The Fairshare Model, share them and add your own.  Join me in calling for valuation disclosure. If you feel particularly supportive, please pre-order the book.


Karl M. Sjogren is the author of a forthcoming book called “The Fairshare Model, a performance-based capital structure for companies that raise venture capital via a public offering.”

It will be published about five months after 250 people pre-order a copy from Inkshares, a publisher that relies on reader support to decide what to publish.

Preview the first chapter at

Applying a Formula for Happiness to Free Trade

formula-for-happinessExpressing happiness in a formula can prompt new thinking about the cause of unhappiness and how to be less unhappy.

Happiness = What’s Happening – Expectations

This formula states that happiness can be increased by improving what is happening or by lowering expectations.

The U.S. is nearly a decade into an economic cycle that has inflamed anxiety that the future is dimmer than the past. Concern about the effects of free trade unites polar opposites on the political spectrum. The happiness formula can help us untangle how we feel about trade by identifying which variables could change.

Turning down the heat on a matter is a good thing. Frustration led U.K. voters to exit the European Union, a decision most regret. In the U.S. anger over the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused a majority to support the invasion of Iraq which is now universally seen as a poor decision. Similar sentiments about the economic outlook has increased interest in protectionist policies.


Let’s consider the second variable first.

Optimism is natural for Americans but some of us have not considered that, in many ways, we have had the wind at our back. We benefited from having abundant resources and separation by oceans from lands that suffered the ravages of war. A continuous infusion of immigrants, many of whom helped advance scientific and commercial innovation, also contributed. In other words, the rise of a prosperous U.S. Middle Class occurred when much of the world was in a weak competitive position.

Challenges to the post-war economy began in the 1970s as soaring oil prices saw foreign automakers take market share out of the domestic arena. Ensuing years saw increases in many imported goods, largely electronics, textiles and furniture. Some U.S. jobs were lost to imports, but there was as yet a feeling that trade was a rising tide that lifted all boats.

The North American Free Trade Act is a lightning rod now, possibly because Ross Perot memorably said in his 1992 presidential campaign that approval of NAFTA would be followed by a “giant sucking sound” as jobs moved from the U.S., but that treaty helped blunt imports from Asia.

Expectations began to waver as competitive factors other than free trade contributed to economic insecurity. Work migrated from the industrial centers to those that offered lower costs—from Rust Belt states to those in the Sun Belt. Companies outsourced activities they had performed in-house. Computers made it easier to move work to where it could be performed more cheaply. There has also been the effect of new business models; big-box and online retailers favor low-cost products and business practices that have devastated traditional retailers.

The cumulative effects are profound. In his book, Rebooting Work, Maynard Webb observes that:

The half-life of a company is diminishing quickly. The average life expectancy of a company in the S&P 500 has dropped from seventy-five years in 1937 to fifteen years today.

What’s Happening

Turn now to “what’s happening” and what can be done to improve it. Put aside tax policies or spending priorities that require unlikely political consensus. Should the U.S. abandon support for free trade?

There is support for this on the political right and left. If maximization of gross domestic product were the sole objective of trade policy, few countries would engage in free trade. They would instead do what promised to benefit their own economy, even if it damages other countries. Such a beggar-thy-neighbor approach was common after the first World War and it helped lead to the second one.

An argument for free trade is that countries that trade are unlikely to go to war; when goods don’t cross borders, armies will. Another is that global resources are better utilized and broader benefits are created when goods are produced by the most efficient producer. Greater choice and lower prices are other benefits.

A country’s challenge is to use social policies to ease the dislocation that occurs when workers in un-competitive industries lose jobs. When that doesn’t happen, the problem is with social policy, not trade policy. Anxiety over trade has intensified in the wake of the Great Recession but that crisis was rooted in capital markets (i.e., financial instruments based on unsound mortgage debt), not trade policy.

Some who cast a dim eye toward free trade view government negatively; they want it smaller and less involved in our everyday lives. For them, an embrace of protectionism is ironic because such policies require more government involvement in the economy. Government  decides which industries to protect and how to do it. It also decides how to spend the revenue generated by tariffs. Should it be used to improve the nation’s competitiveness? If so, how and where? The opportunity for influence-peddling leads lobbyists to anticipate protectionism as the media views an election—good for their bottom line.

However one feels about government picking winners and losers, protectionism advocates face a key question. How will it increase long-term demand for American products?

If Not Protectionism, What?

The fundamental solution is for Americans to be more productive than their competition. If we can’t do that as the result of innovation, nimbleness or quality, it requires lower costs.

In their book, Better Capitalism, economists Robert E. Litan and Carl J. Schramm propose four strategic initiatives to change what is happening in the decades ahead:

  1. Encourage immigration by high-skilled foreigners
  2. Speed up commercialization of innovations at universities
  3. Improve access to capital for new firms
  4. Regulatory reform

The first initiative runs counter to anti-immigration sentiment, the running mate of protectionism, but it helps the U.S. compete on brainpower. The second and third enhance innovation and economic nimbleness.

Litan’s and Schramm’s fourth initiative is controversial. Industry upstarts and those on the political right often want less regulation. Those on the left want more, as may industry incumbents for whom regulations serve as barriers to competition. Nonetheless, policymakers can clear the regulatory underbrush. They can also reform social policies, such as those concerning education and training, to enhance competitiveness; those that promote equal opportunity will nurture hope in the future.

Another Idea: Cooperation Between Capital and Labor as a Competitive Tool.  

The Fairshare Model, a book I’m writing, presents a way to do this. It’s about a performance-based capital structure for companies that raise venture capital in an initial public offering. I call it the Fairshare Model because it balances and aligns the interests of investors and employees.

For decades, venture-stage companies have been responsible for more economic growth and job creation than Fortune 500 companies. They present investors with two risks—failure and overvaluation—and the model mitigates the valuation risk.

The Fairshare Model has two classes of stock. Both vote but only one can trade. Investors get the tradable stock, known as Investor Stock, and employees get the non-tradable stock, known as Performance Stock. Performance Stock converts to Investor Stock based on milestones.

The Fairshare Model improves access to capital (#3 above) with a deal that encourages investors to invest. If a rise in the Investor Stock price is a performance criteria, a company will set its IPO price low. It also helps companies attract and manage human capital. They will offer employees Performance Stock, which pays off when they deliver the performance investors expect.

If the Fairshare Model proves viable with start-ups, established companies may adopt it. To grasp the significance of this, consider the challenges that General Motors confronted as the era of rising fuel prices began. Uncompetitive products eventually led it to bankruptcy. If its capital structure had been based on the Fairshare Model, employees would have had owned Performance Stock that would have changed their response to developments. The quality of communications and the sense of urgency and responsibility throughout GM would have been higher. Product design would have been more competitive. Workers would have been more interested in better processes and training and less inclined to push for higher wages and benefits.

Now imagine that Sears and Roebuck, U.S. Steel, Eastman Kodak and other once iconic companies used the Fairshare Model. It has the potential to enhance competitiveness and ease income inequality by enabling those who rely on a declining return on labor to participate in the higher return on capital.

Over time, initiatives like these, which don’t rely on a lower labor rates, can improve “What’s Happening” by making the American economy more productive and its participants happier.


The Fairshare Model will be published about five months after 250 people pre-order a copy from Inkshares, a publisher that decides what projects to back based on reader support (crowd funding).

You can preview the first chapter and place a pre-order here.

With the USD $5 credit that Inkshares issues to new customers, an e-book will set you back just $10. A combination of an e-book and signed print book, $20. If it isn’t published or you cancel your order before the book is shipped, Inkshares will refund your money. So, for a modest, risk-free amount, you can help launch a discussion about how to re-imagine capitalism.

Pre-Order Bonus

A special version of chapter 13, Calculating Valuation, with tables to look-up the pre-money valuation based on the size of the offering and the percentage of the company offered.  The tables are not in the full draft at

If you are unsure what a company’s pre-money valuation is, why it is important or how to calculate it, this video is for you The slide deck is here

Storm of Beta, a behavioral finance website, interviews Karl Sjogren of the Fairshare Model

On October 10, 2015, the financial/economic education website Storm of Beta ( published an extensive interview with me.

The interview is here

Storm of Beta is a website that focuses on financial and economic insights. Its “penny for your thoughts” series covers insights into behavioral finance and its implications and applications to financial markets. That focus brought The Fairshare Model to the attention of Storm of Beta, as it is nothing if not an application of behavioral finance to the public venture capital market..


Three new chapters address objections to equity crowdfunding

The September 24, 2015 update to the draft of The Fairshare Model book adds three chapters that discuss concerns that have been raised about equity crowdfunding. The principal focus is fraud, overvaluation and business failure. Particular attention is focused on the cause of failure and a common cause of it–management.

Other objections discussed as well such as unethical sales practices and the sensibility that is expressed as “why don’t we simply rely on VCs to meet the needs of young companies?”

See the resources tab!

NewFinance presentation on May 28, 2015

On May 28, 2015, I made a presentation on the Fairshare Model to the NewFinance Meetup group in San Francisco. The slide deck is under the Resources tab.

When I made my October 2014 presentation (slide deck under Resources as well), I had just one chapter posted online–what is chapter two in the May draft.

Now, fourteen chapters are online! Therefore, this latest slide deck has more to summarize. In particular, chapter ten on the Tao of the Fairshare Model (my favorite) and chapter five, Target Companies for the Fairshare Model.

Check out the submissions for the world’s 1st crowd-sourced book on FINTECH


What is the FinTech Book?

It is the 1st globally crowd-sourced book on FINTECH which will compile the insights and stories of the FINTECH community. [And the Fairshare Model is a candidate for inclusion]

Why is it important?

To date there only exits a fragmented source of knowledge on the Sector. This is reflected by the fact that the FINTECH sector is both recent in its development and wide in its scope. Therefore crowd-sourcing its content appears the best way to create a comprehensive book on the sector.

Who is the Audience:

Unlike other tech sectors the FINTECH industry will impact every one either directly or indirectly. Indeed if before finance was “needed by all but benefited a few” the FINTECH sector is now changing this by bringing back value to retail and institutional clients.

The FINTECH book aims to become an educational and inspiring piece of work targeted to entrepreneurs, financial institutions, decision makers, investors and consumers.

How does the Crowd-source process work?

There is a 5 step process for authors and the community spanning from March until July 2015.

  • Authors – Pitch their ideas by submitting via e-mail an initial 300 word article to the editors before the 30 April 2015.
  • Authors – Define their ideas by choosing one of the pre-selected topics.
  • Community – Throughout May the community can select the initial articles they wish to see in the FINTECH book

See Fairshare Model abstract

  • Authors – Selected authors must expand on their initial articles to have a 2,000 word chapter by the 30 July 2015.
  • Authors – Non selected authors will have their details and topic acknowledge in a special chapter.

The editors will then compile and edit the work ahead of the publication of the Book, due November 2015.

March 8, 2015 Update

The March 8, 2015 update adds two chapters. Chapter ten explores the potential for cooperation–cooperation within a company’s micro-networks of shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers–to provide a tool for competition. Chapter ten explains the Tao of the Fairshare Model. This is my favorite chapter and it will pride grist for thought for anyone with an interest is the defining characteristics of capital structures.

Here’s how chapter ten ends:

 This chapter concludes Section II, which began by examining a range of ideas about two macro-economic concerns that provide context for the Fairshare Model—economic growth and income inequality. It then considered how the ability to cooperate creates might offer diverse ways to address these twin challenges and how Fairshare Model promotes this. This chapter identified two structural elements that determine how a capital structure allocates uncertainty in an equity financing, something that will inform the discussion about economic growth, income inequality and equity crowdfunding. It also presented the most remarkable aspect of the Fairshare Model—it provides venture-stage companies a reason to offer public investors a low valuation. As a consequence, the model enables a well-performing team to create more wealth for themselves than if they use a conventional model and to create competitive advantage when it comes to managing human capital.
The tao of the Fairshare Model is clear—it is to balance the interests of entrepreneurial companies and public investors.
This section has been broad in content and philosophical perspective. Section III returns to narrower micro-economic matters, issues that come into play when venture-stage companies raise venture capital in a public offering—valuation, fraud and failure.


Jan. 29, 2015 exposure draft adds chapters on economic growth & income inequality

The exposure draft uploaded Jan. 29, 2015 moves the discussion about the Fairshare Model to a macro-economic level. The first two chapters in Section II deal with how the model fits into the on-going debate about how to spur economic growth, job creation and address growing income inequality.

All are topical subjects. Although the Fairshare Model is not designed to address any of them, they provide a macro-economic context for the micro-economic matters that were discussed in the first six chapters that comprise Section I.

I’ll add two more chapters to Section II in the weeks ahead. One  will deal with the potential for the ability to cooperate to be a competitive differentiator in the decades ahead and the other will deal with philosophic matters.

By the end of February, I’ll start Section III, which will lead off with chapters on valuation.